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Abstract 
We report an extension of the procedure devised by Weinstein and Shanks (2008) to study false 
recognition and priming of pictures. Participants viewed scenes with multiple embedded objects 
(seen items), then studied the names of these objects and the names of other objects (read items). 
Finally, participants completed a combined direct (recognition) and indirect (identification) 
memory test that included seen items, read items, and new items. In the direct test, participants 
recognized pictures of seen and read items more often than new pictures. In the indirect test, 
participants’ speed at identifying those same pictures was improved for those pictures they had 
actually studied, and also for falsely recognized pictures whose names they had read. These data 
provide new evidence that a false memory induction procedure can elicit memory-like 
representations that are difficult to distinguish from ‘true’ memories of studied pictures. 
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False Recognition of Objects in Visual Scenes: Findings from a Combined Direct and Indirect 
Memory Test 
Plenty of evidence exists that people can be induced to recognize pictures they have 
never seen before (e.g., Fazendeiro, Winkielman, Luo, & Lorah, 2005; Hintzman, 1988; Israel & 
Schacter, 1997; Koutstaal, Verfaellie, & Schacter, 2001; Weinstein & Shanks, 2008, 2010). A 
question that intrigues many researchers, though, is to what extent this false recognition can be 
distinguished from true recognition (Schacter & Slotnick, 2004; Stark, Okado, & Loftus, 2010). 
The question is somewhat complicated by the fact that participants in such studies make 
recognition errors for multiple reasons. People might, for instance, falsely believe that they saw 
pictures of unseen items that are perceptually or conceptually related to items that they did see 
(e.g., Henkel & Franklin, 1998; Koutstaal et al., 2001). Alternatively, they might falsely 
recognize pictures after being exposed to the names of the pictures (e.g., Weinstein & Shanks, 
2008, 2010). In the present study we asked: Are certain types of false recognition easier to 
discriminate from true recognition than others? 
Attempts have been made to answer this question by examining participants’ 
introspections regarding the perceptual qualities of true and false memories, either with verbal 
reports (e.g., Heaps & Nash, 2001; Lampinen, Odegard, & Bullington, 2003; Norman & 
Schacter, 1997; Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus 1986) or rating scales (e.g., Johnson, Suengas, 
Foley, & Raye, 1988; Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997). Although the results have been mixed, 
the phenomenological differences between true and false memories appear to be quite subtle. 
One arguably more sensitive method by which researchers have examined similarities and 
differences between true and false recognition is with indirect memory tests.  
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In a typical perceptual indirect test, participants might be timed as they try to identify 
stimuli that are revealed incrementally (e.g., Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983; Stark & 
McClelland, 2000). These studies consistently show that people can identify stimuli more 
quickly if they have seen them before (commonly referred to as a priming effect; Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981). The types of indirect tests we are interested in are thus designed to be highly 
sensitive to the presence of perceptual memory traces; indeed, a change from verbal stimuli in 
the study phase to pictorial stimuli in the test phase typically eliminates perceptual priming 
(Hirshman, Snodgrass, Mindes, & Feenan, 1990; Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979; 
Weldon, Roediger, Beitel, & Johnston, 1995). However, some studies have shown that just like 
genuine memories, false ‘memories’ also display perceptual priming effects. For example, using 
a word-stem completion task to test memory indirectly, McDermott (1997) found perceptual 
priming of words that participants had genuinely studied in the experiment, but also priming of 
unstudied words that were strongly associated with studied words. Similarly, Gottesman (2011) 
had participants view objects in scenes, and then take a perceptual implicit test that involved 
judging the distance between two objects. Performance on this task is usually primed by prior 
perception of the scene, but in this new version of the paradigm even partial scenes—which 
excluded the target items—primed responses when the unseen parts of the scene could be easily 
imagined. In addition, Kherif, Josse, and Price (2011) demonstrated that the left ventral occipito-
temporal cortex shows priming effects regardless of visual form (word or picture). More 
numerous than these studies of perceptual priming, though, are studies that find conceptual 
priming of unstudied stimuli (e.g., Horner & Henson, 2011; Friese et al., 2012); that is, where the 
priming test taps into an item’s meaning rather than its visual or auditory qualities. Findings such 
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as these have led many researchers to conclude that true and false recognition might be based on 
memory traces with similar perceptual and/or conceptual qualities. 
Arguments that the characteristics of false memories can mirror those of true memories 
are consistent with the predictions of the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF; Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Source monitoring accounts have been used to explain a variety 
of memory errors, such as the apparent suggestibility of eyewitness testimony (Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989). In particular, the SMF posits that elaborating on internally-generated mental 
images can make them increasingly ‘memory-like’, and can create confusions between observed 
and imagined events (e.g., Dodson & Johnson, 1993; Intraub & Hoffman, 1992).  Research on 
source monitoring has demonstrated that false memories do indeed seem to acquire details such 
as location, shape, and color (e.g., Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, & Leding, 2005; Lyle & Johnson, 
2006). These imported details, we might predict, could produce perceptual priming of unseen 
pictures on an indirect memory test, which would make it difficult to discriminate true from false 
memories. 
One recent study, though, appears to suggest that visual false memories are not 
accompanied by priming effects as true memories are. In Weinstein and Shanks’ (2008) 
procedure, participants first studied a set of pictures, then studied a set of words, most of which 
were the names of objects they had studied as pictures, but some of which named objects from 
the same thematic categories as the studied items (e.g., fruit; clothing) but that were not studied. 
Subsequently, participants took a combined direct and indirect memory test in which they [1] 
identified pictures that were gradually revealed, and [2] judged whether they recognized those 
pictures from the first phase. Some pictures in this test were indeed shown in the first phase, but 
the test also included pictures of thematically-related objects whose names participants had only 
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read, and new pictures from the same thematic categories. Weinstein and Shanks (2008) found 
that studying object-names increased false alarms on the (direct) recognition test, but did not 
produce perceptual priming on the (indirect) identification test. This finding led the authors to 
conclude that false recognition of pictures is not accompanied by facilitation of object 
identification in the way that true recognition is. These findings would therefore suggest that 
false recognition of visual stimuli is not based on perceptual memory traces, and that true and 
false recognition can thus be discriminated on the basis of indirect perceptual memory tests.  
Weinstein and Shanks’ (2008) findings seem at odds with predictions of the Source 
Monitoring Framework, which posits that false memories can acquire perceptual details. 
However, their data may have been insensitive to priming effects associated with false 
recognition, for the following reason. Priming should only reasonably occur for pictures that are 
actually recognized, not for every picture. This statement can apply to both true and false 
memory. To illustrate: studying a picture should elicit both correct recognition and priming on a 
subsequent test. Yet if, for example, the participant looked away when a particular picture was 
presented, they of course should not recognize that picture. Rather, they should call that picture 
‘new’ during the subsequent recognition test, and we would not expect any facilitation (i.e., 
priming) when they identified that picture. This same logic applies also to items presented as 
words during the false memory induction. For these “read” items, we might predict priming 
effects for items that were falsely recognized as ‘old’ (i.e., items for which a false memory was 
formed), but we would not expect to see priming for pictures that were correctly called ‘new’ 
(i.e., items for which a false memory was not formed). Thus, in order to measure priming for 
falsely recognized pictures, we need to conditionalize our reaction time analyses by recognition 
response. In Weinstein and Shanks (2008), priming was measured only by item status (pictures 
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whose names were studied compared to new pictures), and not conditionalized by recognition 
response because of insufficient observations in each cell of the recognition response by item 
status interaction. 
In this paper, we sought to replicate and expand Weinstein and Shanks (2008) procedure 
to allow for sufficient statistical power to analyze identification priming of falsely recognized 
items. We compared identification reaction times (RTs) for true recognition to RTs for two types 
of false recognition that Weinstein and Shanks’ procedure elicits: [1] false recognition of 
pictures that are thematically related to pictures that were truly seen (new pictures), and [2] false 
recognition of thematically-related pictures whose names were also studied (read pictures). We 
predicted that exposure to picture names would promote false recognition, but more crucially, 
that this extra exposure would facilitate identification and thus make performance on the indirect 
test more similar to that of true recognition. Previous research has found that false memories can 
contain the kinds of details usually associated with true memories; here we ask whether these 
properties of false memories can be detected on an indirect test. 
Experiment 1 
The experiments in this paper are similar in design to those described by Weinstein and 
Shanks (2008), with a three-phase procedure comprising a study phase, a false memory 
induction, and a test phase. In the present study, we wanted participants to falsely recognize a 
reasonable number of new pictures, so that identification latencies for these items could be 
compared to those of items presented in our false memory induction. Therefore, unlike in 
Weinstein and Shanks (2008), participants in the present studies saw picture stimuli in the 
context of naturalistic scenes, each of which contained multiple objects with thematic 
associations. This scene context, we predicted, should increase participant’s tendency to falsely 
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recognize entirely new pictures, as well as increasing ecological validity. Previous studies have 
used objects in scenes as stimuli to investigate false recognition (e.g., Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998) 
and perceptual priming (e.g., VanRullen & Koch, 2003), but none to date have studied these 
direct and indirect measures together within the context of visual scenes.  
Method 
Participants and Design. Thirty Washington University undergraduates participated for 
course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three counterbalancing conditions. 
We used a repeated-measures design with item type (seen/read/new) as the only manipulated 
variable; dependent measures were accuracy on the recognition test and RTs to identify pictures. 
Materials. We assembled a stimulus-set of 144 color photographs of objects taken 
primarily from the database created by VanRullen and Koch (2003), but supplemented with 
images obtained from the Internet. For Experiment 1, only 110 of these pictures were used. 
Pictures were selected that fit into one of five categories: animals, clothes, electrical appliances, 
fruit and vegetables, and household objects (plus a sixth category—furniture—that was used in 
Experiment 2).  
We then sourced five ‘scene’ photographs from the Internet, to provide a context for the 
individual objects. For example, for the ‘fruit and vegetables’ scene, we selected a picture of an 
empty refrigerator. Using Adobe Photoshop, we created naturalistic scenes by superimposing 
object pictures onto the relevant background image (Figure 1 shows an example scene; lists of 
the objects in each scene can be obtained from the corresponding author). We created two 
different scenes for each of the five categories, each using the same background image but with a 
completely different set of embedded objects. For each of these 10 scenes, we created three 
versions for counterbalancing such that each critical item functioned equally often across 
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participants as a seen item, a read item, and a new item. In each of these counterbalancing 
versions, 7 of the 9 objects remained constant (these were fillers); the remaining 2 objects 
differed between versions.  
Each participant saw all ten scenes during the study phase of the experiment, but only one 
version of each scene. Therefore, participants saw 20 critical items during the study phase (i.e., 2 
items x 10 scenes). A further 20 critical items appeared as words in the false memory induction 
phase described shortly. A final 20 items did not appear until the test phase. The test phase 
consisted of all 60 critical items. 
Procedure. The experiment comprised three phases: The study phase in which 
participants viewed scenes; the false memory induction phase in which participants studied the 
names of objects; and the test phase in which participants identified object pictures and indicated 
whether they recognized each object.  
 Study Phase. During encoding, participants studied ten scenes (each containing nine 
items) for 15 sec each. Participants were told that each scene would appear on the screen for 15 
seconds, and that the next scene would appear automatically. They were told to study each scene 
carefully while it was on the screen, and to try to take in every object in the scene. A 5-min 
distractor task followed, during which participants performed multiplication problems. 
False memory induction Phase. Participants were next told that they would be studying 
the names of objects they had seen in the scenes. Seventy words appeared sequentially on the 
screen for 4 sec each, and as an orientation task to ensure encoding, participants were asked to 
indicate the number of vowels in each word presented. In Weinstein and Shanks (2008, 
Experiment 4), very shallow processing of object words was sufficient to induce false 
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recognition of pictures of those objects. Thus, we expected that vowel-counting would similarly 
elicit false recognition. 
Only 50 of the 70 words presented actually referred to objects that had appeared in the 
scenes, of which 20 were our critical “seen items” and 30 were fillers. The remaining 20 words 
referred to objects that had not appeared in the scenes, hereafter referred to as “read items”. To 
make room for the 20 read items, the names of 20 objects that did appear in the scenes were 
removed from the list; the same 20 words were removed for all participants. Participants made 
responses by pressing the numerical key corresponding to the number of vowels in each word. 
Test Phase. Immediately after the false memory induction phase, participants were 
presented with pictures of the 60 critical objects sequentially, in a random order. Pictures of seen, 
imagined, and new objects were each presented in a 300 x 300 pixel square with a white 
background. The test combined both identification (indirect) and recognition (direct) 
components. On each trial, participants first attempted to identify a picture as it flashed briefly 
on the screen. The picture would appear repeatedly, followed immediately by a mask image (see 
Weinstein & Shanks, 2008, Figure 1). Each time the picture appeared, it remained on the screen 
for a slightly longer duration whereas the mask followed for a shorter duration; each ‘picture—
mask’ presentation cycle spanned 250 ms. On the first cycle, the picture appeared for 16.7 ms 
(and the mask for 233.3 ms) and this duration increased by 16.7 ms on each presentation, for a 
total of 14 sequences (3500 ms in total). Participants pressed ‘Enter’ once they thought they 
could identify the object pictured, at which point the picture disappeared, RT was recorded, and 
participants typed the object’s name. After this identification—or after 3500 ms, if participants 
did not press ‘Enter’—participants were again shown the object picture on the screen, and asked 
to indicate without time limit whether the picture was “old” (i.e., it was presented in the Study 
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Phase) or “new” (i.e., it was not presented in the Study Phase). Responses were made on a 6-
point scale from 1 = very sure new to 6 = very sure old. This combined identification and 
recognition judgment process was repeated for each of the 60 test items. 
Results 
 In the following analysis we first examine whether recognition and identification RT data 
in our scene paradigm replicate Weinstein and Shanks (2008), who presented objects in isolation. 
We then test our prediction of priming on falsely recognized objects (i.e., pictures incorrectly 
called ‘old’). All analyses are significant to p < .05 unless otherwise stated. 
Recognition. Following Weinstein and Shanks, responses made on the 6-point scale were 
classified as “old” or “new” by binning responses 4-6 and 1-3 respectively. The first row of 
Table 1 displays the proportion of each item type called “old”. A repeated-measures ANOVA on 
these data found a significant effect of item type, F(2, 58) = 125.16, ηp2 = .81. Follow-up paired 
t-tests revealed that the proportion of ‘hits’ to seen items (M = .81, SD = .15) was significantly 
greater than the proportion of false alarms to read items (M = .35, SD = .18), t(29) = 12.52, d = 
2.78, and to new items (M = .27, SD = .15) , t(29) = 13.34, d = 3.61. As we had hoped, the false 
alarm rate to new items here was considerably higher than in Weinstein and Shanks (2008; M = 
.11 across their Experiments 1-3), perhaps due to the context provided by presenting the objects 
in scenes. Of primary importance was that false alarms to read items were significantly more 
frequent than were false alarms to new objects, t(29) = 2.37, d = 0.47. In other words, counting 
the vowels in an object-word increased the likelihood of participants falsely recognizing a 
picture of that object. 
Identification. We next analyzed identification RTs, excluding individual response data 
for trials that met any of three criteria: [1] the picture was identified incorrectly; [2] identification 
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times were less than 250 ms (i.e., the duration of one picture/mask cycle); and [3] identification 
times were over 3500 ms, the entire duration of the identification cycle. For correct picture 
identification (exclusion criterion [1] above), participants had to produce an object name that was 
sufficiently similar to the depicted object, with misspellings and variants (e.g., “dictionary” 
instead of “book) accepted as correct. These three exclusion criteria resulted in the exclusion of 
3.7% of data-points. In the analyses of identification data that follow, we calculated each 
participant’s median RT for each cell of the experimental design; descriptive and inferential 
statistics are therefore based on the means of these individual participant by condition medians 
(i.e., the medians averaged across participants). The first row of Table 2 shows RT data for each 
item type, and a repeated-measures ANOVA on these data was significant, F(2, 58) = 7.23, ηp2 = 
.20. Paired-sample t-tests showed that seen items (M = 1320 ms, SD = 242) were identified faster 
than both read items (M = 1383 ms, SD = 293), t(29) = 2.47, d = 0.23, and new items (M = 1415 
ms, SD = 301), t(29) = 3.75, d = 0.35. Replicating Weinstein and Shanks’ (2008) results, the 
difference between identification RTs for read and new pictures did not approach significance, 
t(29) = 1.26, p = .22, d = 0.11. 
Identification RTs for falsely recognized pictures. Our indirect test results so far 
replicate those of Weinstein and Shanks (2008), and suggest that studying the name of an object 
promoted false recognition but did not prime identification. However, as we outlined above, it is 
possible that we might only detect a significant priming effect when we focus solely on the RT 
data for items that were judged (correctly or incorrectly) to be ‘old’.  
We therefore conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on participants’ RT data for 
pictures they called ‘old’. We excluded the data of 1 participant who did not respond ‘old’ to at 
least one picture of each item type (this participant did not respond ‘old’ to any read items). As 
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the left-half of Figure 2 illustrates, this ANOVA revealed significant differences in RTs between 
item types, F(2, 56) = 8.56, ηp2 = .23. Seen items were identified faster than new items, t(28) = 
3.15, d = 0.59, but read items too were identified faster than new items, t(28) = 3.06, d = 0.57. In 
other words, there did appear to be a priming effect for read pictures that were falsely identified 
as ‘old’, as compared with new pictures that were falsely identified as ‘old’. Interestingly, RTs 
for read items called ‘old’ were not significantly greater than RTs for correctly identified seen 
items, t(28) = 0.55, p = .59; that is, this type of false recognition was impossible to discriminate 
from true recognition on this implicit test. This analysis thus provides support for the claim that 
false recognition memory can indeed prime identification. 
An alternative explanation of these findings depends not on the presence of a particular 
type of memory, but on the mental availability of object-words. According to this interpretation, 
RTs for read items might be faster not because of any visual memory representation for those 
items, but because seeing an object’s name makes that name come to participants’ minds more 
readily when the object is shown later on. This is a reasonable account, but one that does not 
seem to fit with our data. If this account were correct, then we should expect to see read items 
being identified faster than new items irrespective of whether they were called ‘old’ or ‘new’. 
However, this was not the case: There were no systematic differences in identification RTs for 
items called ‘new’ as a function of item type (Seen, M = 1384 ms, SD = 399; Read, M = 1426 
ms, SD = 326; New, M = 1409 ms, SD = 316), F(2, 50) = 0.33, p = .72. Note that for the analysis 
on items called ‘new’, we had to exclude four participants who did not have at least one ‘new’ 
response for each of the three item types (all four of these participants did not respond ‘new’ to 
any of the seen items). We also repeated the analysis for items called ‘old’ on this reduced 
sample (n = 26), and found the same results to those reported above (for the n = 29 sample)1. 
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Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 our false memory induction increased false recognition but did not prime 
identification of pictures. In this respect, our results replicate those of Weinstein and Shanks 
(2008). Extending Weinstein and Shanks’ findings, though, we did observe a priming effect 
when our analysis was narrowed only to those items judged to be ‘old’. This finding raises the 
interesting possibility that a priming effect does occur for pictures of objects that are falsely 
recognized after their names are read. To test the reliability of this priming result, in Experiment 
2 we replicated Experiment 1, including a greater number of critical items and participants. 
Method 
Participants and Design.  Fifty-five Washington University undergraduates participated 
and received course credit. One participant’s data were excluded from analysis because they did 
not understand the identification task. The design and dependent measures were identical to 
those of Experiment 1. 
Materials. The full set of 144 object pictures described in the Materials section of 
Experiment 1 was used in this experiment, with the picture categories supplemented with a 
furniture category. For each of the six scenes, we superimposed eight object pictures onto the 
relevant background. The main difference from Experiment 1 was that in these scenes, all eight 
items were ‘critical’; that is, there were no filler items. Three versions of each scene were created 
for counterbalancing, and because all items were critical, each of these versions contained a 
completely different set of eight objects. Like in Experiment 1, each critical item functioned 
equally often across participants as a seen item, a read item, and a new item. 
Procedure. For the critical manipulation, all 144 items (24 items x 6 categories) served 
as critical items. Of these, 48 items appeared in the scenes participants viewed during the study 
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phase, i.e., 8 objects x 6 scenes (seen items); 48 items appeared as words in the false memory 
induction phase (read items); and 48 did not appear until the test phase (new items). The test 
phase consisted of all 144 items. The three phases were otherwise identical to Experiment 1 
except that the distractor task following the study phase was reduced to 2 min. 
Results 
Recognition. As in Experiment 1, responses made on the 6-point scale were classified as 
“old” or “new” by binning responses 4-6 and 1-3 respectively. The second row of Table 1 
presents the proportion of each item type judged to be “old”, and a repeated-measures ANOVA 
on these data revealed a significant main effect of item type, F(1.27, 67.5) = 397.7, ηp2 = .88. 
Follow-up paired t-tests showed that participants were more likely to give ‘old’ responses to seen 
items (M = .79, SD = .15) than to read items (M = .26, SD = .16), t(53) = 18.90, d = 3.42, and to 
new items (M = .20, SD = .14), t(53) = 22.89, d = 4.07. Crucially, though, they were also more 
likely to give ‘old’ responses to read items than to new items, t(53) = 4.81, d = 0.40. Replicating 
the results of Experiment 1, then, counting the vowels in object names in the false memory 
induction phase significantly increased false recognition of pictures of those objects. 
Identification. Before examining participants’ RT data, we excluded data-points using 
the same criteria as in Experiment 1. This excluded 4.5% of data-points. The second row of 
Table 2 shows averaged median RTs for each item type; a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed 
a significant main effect of item type, F(2, 106) = 28.7, ηp2 = .35. Paired t-tests showed that seen 
items (M = 1268 ms, SD = 286) were identified faster on average than read items (M = 1353 ms, 
SD = 241), t(53) = 4.69, d = 0.32, and new items (M = 1386 ms, SD = 271), t(53) = 8.55, d = 
0.42. However, unlike in Experiment 1 and the findings of Weinstein and Shanks (2008), read 
items were also identified significantly faster than new items, t(53) = 2.06, d = 0.13. The effect 
16 
FALSE RECOGNITION TESTED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY 
size of this comparison is similar to that of Experiment 1, suggesting that increasing the number 
of stimuli in each condition afforded us sufficient power in this version of the procedure to detect 
the underlying effect. 
 Identification RTs for falsely recognized pictures. As in Experiment 1, we conducted 
additional analysis of participants’ RT data for items they called ‘old’. However, because 
Experiment 2 was designed specifically to give us more observations in each cell of the design, 
we chose to exclude from this analysis any participants who failed to provide at least four “old” 
judgments per item type (as in Weinstein & Shanks, 2008, footnotes 1-3). Doing so left us with 
39 participants’ data for analysis, still above the sample size used in Experiment 1. 
 As illustrated in the right-half of Figure 2, when participants classified an item as ‘old’, 
there was a significant effect of item type on RT, F(2, 76) = 23.77, ηp2 = .39. Specifically, seen 
items were identified faster than were new items, t(38) = 7.83, d = 0.63; but, of more importance, 
read items were also recognized faster than were new items, t(38) = 3.19, d = 0.33. These results 
replicate those of Experiment 1 in showing that when participants falsely recognized pictures of 
objects, their identification of these items was significantly faster if they had encountered the 
object-word than if they had not. However, unlike in Experiment 1, identification RTs for seen 
items correctly called ‘old’ were significantly faster than were the RTs for falsely identified read 
items, t(38) = 3.37, d = 0.31. Again, there was no evidence that the identification priming for 
read items was driven by word availability rather than memory: there were no systematic RT 
differences for items called ‘new’ as a function of item type (Seen, M = 1380 ms, SD = 355; 
Read, M = 1370 ms, SD = 255; New, M = 1391 ms, SD = 285), F(2, 90) = 0.26, p = .77. Note 
that this latter analysis was performed on the data from 46 participants who had at least 4 ‘new’ 
responses for each item type. We also repeated the analyses on the sample of participants who 
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had at least 4 responses in both the ‘called old’ and ‘called new’ categories (n = 36), and 
obtained the same results. 
Discussion 
In two experiments, we showed that a simple procedure involving shallow (largely 
lexical) processing of object words promoted false recognition of pictures. More importantly, our 
indirect test data showed that the false recognition induced by this procedure was accompanied 
by priming. Indirect memory tests represent one way of comparing the phenomenology of true 
and false memories, and our data resonate with those of studies that used direct measures—such 
as introspective reports (Heaps & Nash, 2001) and source attributions of perceptual features 
(Lyle & Johnson, 2007)—to demonstrate that the two can be equivalent. Our findings are on the 
whole consistent with Weinstein and Shanks (2008), and extend their findings to the more 
naturalistic context of visual scenes. Importantly, though, our analyses might reconcile Weinstein 
and Shanks’ data with those of studies from the source monitoring literature, as we discuss 
shortly. 
In both experiments, our perceptual identification task was highly effective at 
discriminating true recognition from pure associative false recognition: that is, false recognition 
of new items that were thematically related to the scene contexts. However, when thematically-
related items were presented to participants in word form during the false memory induction, 
subsequent identification latencies for the pictures became faster, and more similar to those for 
true recognition. Put differently, this shallow (largely lexical) processing of items made the 
indirect task a less useful method for distinguishing true from false recognition: In Experiment 1, 
there was no significant RT difference between these memories and true memories; in 
Experiment 2 there remained a significant difference, but this was small. 
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These findings seem to contradict Weinstein and Shanks’ (2008) conclusion that their 
participants’ false memories were not driven by perceptual representations. In fact, when the 
reaction time data are analyzed contingent on the recognition response, and with sufficient 
power, the indirect test data are consistent with the hypothesis that perceptual detail does indeed 
accompany participants’ false memories. This finding is important because it corroborates and 
extends numerous other studies that investigated the presence of perceptual details in false 
memories using direct tests (e.g., Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, & Leding, 2005; Lyle & Johnson, 
2006). For example, Lyle and Johnson’s (2006) participants saw objects displayed in different 
locations on a computer screen, and imagined others. The authors found that location 
information associated with viewed objects was misattributed at test to imagined objects that 
were perceptually similar (e.g., a cane and a crowbar, which are unrelated semantically but have 
a similar shape). The authors invoked a reactivation/misattribution process account to explain 
how imagined objects in their study acquired perceptual details (i.e., location information). 
According to their explanation, when an imagined object is presented at test, it reactivates a set 
of perceptual features that actually belong to a perceptually-similar viewed object. The key 
feature (location) is then misattributed to the imagined object. In our study, a similar process 
may have occurred in the false memory induction phase. That is, when a previously unseen 
object was named in the vowel-counting phase, it may have activated perceptual features 
associated with similar objects that had appeared in the scenes. Perceptual details of these seen 
objects could then become associated with the unseen object names. In addition to this specific 
feature importation process involving studied objects, the imagination process could also result 
in participants importing perceptual features from outside the study context (Johnson et al., 
1988). In the context of studies showing that imagination can result in false memories that are 
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rich in perceptual qualities, our data suggest that the ease of detecting false memories might 
depend on the extent to which they have been elaborated upon, with only minimal elaboration 
being necessary to make the discrimination task more difficult.  
Two further points about our data are important to note. The first is that our results do not 
rule out the possibility of interdependence between recognition and priming. Participants could 
be using the ease of identification as a cue to recognition, thus increasing or even creating the 
relationship between the indirect and direct test. That is, participants may have an awareness 
(conscious or otherwise) that previously seen objects would be easier to identify than those they 
were seeing for the first time, so that a surprisingly fluent identification would increase the 
chance of making an “old” judgment on the recognition test. This possibility is supported by 
studies such as Johnston, Dark, and Jacoby (1985) that have linked fluency to recognition, and in 
fact this reliance on fluency is an inherent possibility in any recognition study, even one that 
does not include a separate object identification test. For this reason, we do not believe that the 
possibility of interdependence affects our claim that elaboration can lead to increased difficulty 
in distinguishing between true and false memories, as demonstrated by our two experiments. 
The second point of note is that throughout this paper, we have assumed that the indirect 
task we used uniquely targets perceptual processes. The assumption is based on studies that used 
a verbal version of the task (Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983; Stark & McClelland, 2000), and 
found a lack of cross-form priming. These prior findings led us to argue specifically that 
perceptual, and not conceptual, information is acquired by false memories in our procedure. 
However this identification task has not been used with pictorial stimuli elsewhere, it is possible 
that this version of the task is also partially driven by conceptual processes. If this were the case, 
our results would fit with those of previous studies that showed cross-form conceptual (or 
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lexical) priming from object names to pictures (e.g., Durso & Johnson, 1979; Horner & Henson, 
2011).  
Our findings, in conjunction with the previous findings described above, have 
implications for attempts to distinguish true from false memories in behavioral and brain-
imaging studies. The general proposal that elaboration increases the similarity between true and 
false memories is consistent with data from brain-imaging studies such as Garoff-Eaton, 
Slotnick, and Schacter (2006), who showed using fMRI that associative false memories had 
more neural commonalities with true memory than did non-associative, spontaneous false 
memories. In the present study, we did not have a ‘control’ condition measuring false recognition 
of new items that were unrelated to the visual scenes: including such a condition would likely 
have required us to use many times more scenes and critical items to find sufficient false alarms 
to these ‘control’ items. For this reason we have no comparison against which to contrast the RT 
data for the new but still thematically-related pictures. We are therefore unable to say whether—
analogously to the semantic associates in McDermott’s (1997) study—the identification of 
falsely recognized ‘new’ items in these studies might too have been primed, albeit to a lesser 
extent than were falsely recognized ‘read’ items. Nevertheless, to our knowledge these studies 
provide the first evidence from an indirect task to show that shallow processing can increase the 
‘memory-like’ properties of false memories. 
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Table 1. Proportion of pictures called ‘old’ in each experiment (SD in parentheses), as a function 
of item type.  
 Seen Read New 
Experiment 1 .81 (.15) .35 (.18) .27 (.15) 
Experiment 2 .79 (.15) .26 (.16) .20 (.14) 
 
27 
FALSE RECOGNITION TESTED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY 
 
Table 2. RTs to identify pictures in the identification task in each experiment (SD in 
parentheses), as a function of item type. The median RT was obtained for each 
participant/condition, and means of these medians were computed to produce the data points in 
the table. 
 Seen Read New 
Experiment 1 1320 (242) 1383 (293) 1415 (301) 
Experiment 2 1268 (286) 1353 (241) 1386 (271) 
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Figure 1. Example of a scene used in Experiment 1. Each scene contained 9 objects. Similar 
scenes were used in Experiment 2, with 8 objects per scene. 
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Figure 2. Identification RTs for pictures participants classified as ‘Old’ in Experiments 1 and 2. 
The median RT was obtained for each participant/condition, and means of these medians were 
computed to produce the data points in the figure. Note that this figure represents data from only 
the participants who recognized at least one picture (Experiment 1) or four pictures (Experiment 
2) of each item type. Error bars represent SEM. 
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Footnotes 
1Although it may be tempting to compare RTs for items called ‘old’ and those called ‘new’, we 
have avoided doing so due to a potential difference in baseline RTs for these item categories. 
That is, although the identification response always occurred before the recognition response, 
that does not necessarily mean that it was made independently of recognition. For example, when 
items seemed familiar to participants, they might have engaged in recollection during the 
identification process to determine the source of the familiarity, thus lengthening the 
identification RT. For this reason, we do not compare RTs for items called ‘old’ with RTs for 
items called ‘new’, but instead compare RTs for different item types (seen/read/new) within each 
of the two types of responses. 
